Le discours international actuel sur l’écologie s’est mué en un mouvement qui s’identifie avec le discours de la vérité scientifique. L’exemple de Greta Thunberg et de ses appels à l’action illustre dans quelle mesure l’identité actuelle du mouvement enveloppe un paradoxe qui lui est inhérent. D’une part, elle s’appuie sur la nature auto-explicative et claire des idées vraies. D’autre part, pour propager ces idées, elle fait résider son pouvoir rhétorique dans l’impact émotionnel. L’approche par Spinoza de la relation entre raison (...) et foi, telle qu’elle apparaît quand on juxtapose les passages pertinents de l’ Éthique et ceux du Traité théologico-politique qui décrivent la prophétie, constitue un cadre théorique susceptible de rendre compte de ce paradoxe inhérent à l’écologie moderne. (shrink)

The purpose of legal theory seems to be a perpetually debated issue among legal scholars. Koskenniemi argues that the history of international legal theory is conditioned by a dialectical movement between a position justifying any given positive law based on the power of states, and a position arguing for a theory of the state where laws are justified only in accordance with certain substantial conditions. According to Lauterpacht there is very little support in Spinoza's political philosophy for a “separate and (...) independent theory of international law”. The chapter aims to contextualize the passages pointed to by Lauterpacht in order to investigate whether such an endeavor may produce an understanding of Spinoza's political philosophy that makes it apt to function as a basis for a practical theory of international law. Lauterpacht's critique of Spinoza's statements on international law hinges on the argument that they deviate from his general explanation of the mechanisms of law‐making. (shrink)

In this article I will argue that the philosophy of Benedict Spinoza may assist us in coming to terms with some of the conceptual challenges that the phenomenon of Artificial Intelligence poses on law and legal thought. I will pursue this argument in three steps. First, I will suggest that Spinoza’s philosophy of the mind and knowledge may function as an analytical tool for making sense of the prevailing conception of AI within the legal discourse on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems. (...) Then, I will continue the argument with the aid of Spinoza’s political philosophy which partly complicates the picture as it seems to disqualify a normative process grounded directly upon the means stipulated for achieving a robust understanding of AI. Based on these two separate discussions I will conclude by outlining a composite critique – from the twofolded perspective of Spinoza’s ethical and political discussions – of the ongoing negotiations of a new Conventional Weapons Convention protocol on LAWS. (shrink)